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ANSELMIAN ETERNALISM:
THE PRESENCE OF A TIMELESS GOD
Katherin A. Rogers
Anselm holds that God is timeless, time is tenseless, and humans have liber-
tarian freedom. This combination of commitments is largely undefended in 
contemporary philosophy of religion. Here I explain Anselmian eternalism 
with its entailment of tenseless time, oﬀ er reasons for accepting it, and defend 
it against criticisms from William Hasker and other Open Theists. I argue that 
the tenseless view is coherent, that God’s eternal omniscience is consistent 
with libertarian freedom, that being eternal greatly enhances divine sover-
eignty, and that the Anselmian view supports the contention that the Bible is 
relevant today far bett er than does Open Theism.
“Now that God is eternal is the common judgement of all who live by 
reason,” writes Boethius.1 Things have changed since Boethius’s day, and 
many contemporary philosophers of religion now question the value, 
and even the coherence, of supposing that God is eternal. In this paper I 
defend “Anselmian eternalism,” the analysis of divine eternity proposed 
by St. Anselm of Canterbury. First I oﬀ er a litt le historical background, 
with a word about Anselm’s predecessors and a quick review of some 
of Anselm’s writing on the subject. Anselm does not devote much time 
to developing and explaining his views on time, and so, in the next sec-
tion, I try to show some of what does, and what does not, follow from 
Anselmian eternalism. Then I explain why, at least on Anselm’s analysis 
of perfection, a perfect being must be eternal. Finally I att empt to respond 
to a series of criticisms raised against the idea that God is timeless—those 
that seem to me not to have been adequately addressed in the literature 
to date. I am especially interested to refute the spirited att ack on divine 
eternity mounted by William Hasker and other Open Theists. 
A Brief History of Anselmian Eternalism
Anselm is, to my knowledge, the fi rst philosopher to spell out clearly the 
conclusion that if God is timeless, then the entire space-time universe 
must be immediately present to Him, with all places and all times equally 
real.2 This is the essentially tenseless view of time. Past, present and future 
are not absolute, rather they are relative to a given temporal perceiver at a 
given time. The main alternative to this theory of time, in the Middle Ages 
and today, is “presentism” or the essentially tensed view of time. The pres-
ent is absolute. All that exists exists in the present, since that is all there is. 
The past and future are absolutely non-existent. I will sometimes use the 
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term “four-dimensionalism” to refer to Anselm’s view. On the essentially 
tenseless view, from the perspective of an ideal observer who sees reality 
as it is, God let us say, the created universe exists “at once” in the three 
dimensions of time, and the fourth dimension of space. I do not insist 
that there are no more dimensions to creation, but Anselm posits only the 
four and sees divine eternity as a sort of fi ft h dimension, “containing” the 
others. So “four-dimensionalism” seems the right term in the context. Of 
course if one were assured that there were more created dimensions, then 
one would simply ascribe to God’s eternity the dimensional level which 
contains all created dimensions. 
Anselm’s famous and infl uential predecessors, Augustine and Boethius, 
both held that God is eternal. But exactly what they mean by “eternal” is 
ambiguous. One possibility is that they are expressing four-dimensionalism, 
but less clearly than Anselm does. For example, Augustine’s famous medita-
tion on the nature of time in Book 11 of the Confessions contains much that 
suggests the idea that all time is equally real, as being present to God. In 
chapter 18 he writes, 
If the future and the past do exist, I want to know where they are. 
I may not be capable of such knowledge, but at least I know that 
wherever they are, they are not there as future or past, but as pres-
ent. For if, wherever they are, they are future, they do not yet exist; 
if past, they no longer exist. So wherever they are and whatever they 
are, it is only by being present that they are.3
Boethius, too, frequently says things that suggest four-dimensionalism. In 
Book 5, Prose 6 of the Consolation he writes, for example, that divine eter-
nity, “hold[s] as present the infi nity of moving time,” and that God looks 
“forward on all things as though from the highest peak of the world.”
But another interpretation, consistent with presentism, is possible.4 On 
this view God exists only in the present moment, since all that there is is 
the present. He is “eternal” in the sense that His nature and His life are 
identical and perfectly simple, and He does not change at all. He is om-
niscient in that, at each present instant, He knows simultaneously and in 
complete detail, all that is, was, and will be. He knows it in the present, all 
in one, changeless and everlasting act of knowing. On this interpretation, 
it is not the case that all of time is actually present to God, since all that 
exists is the present. How, then, could He know a future which has not 
yet happened? For Augustine and Boethius this question does not pose 
a problem. Both hold that God is the cause of everything that happens, 
so He can know the future in knowing His own intentions.5 But how, as 
many contemporary philosophers have asked, could such an unchang-
ing God know what time it is right now? Neither Augustine nor Boethius 
addresses this question. If they are indeed propounding the presentist, 
rather than the four-dimensionalist, view of time, then I do not see that 
they can answer it. In explaining four-dimensionalism and responding to 
criticisms, I will show how the Anselmian can deal with these questions.
Anselm’s four-dimensionalism is unambiguous, as a brief look at a few 
proof texts will demonstrate. First, though, a quick sketch of Anselm’s 
theological committ ments and methodology will be helpful. Anselm is a 
ANSELMIAN ETERNALISM 5
classical theist. Today “classical theism” has come to mean the view that 
God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, on many possible 
analyses of those att ributes. The traditional, classical theism of Anselm—
and Augustine and Aquinas—insists upon more. For our purposes the im-
portant points are that God is simple and immutable, and divine creation 
means the sustaining in being from moment to moment of everything 
which is not God. There is nothing, not a being, nor a positive property, 
nor even a proposition, which is not either God or dependent upon God’s 
nature or will.6 
Regarding methodology, Anselm, as the beginning of the famous Pro-
slogion argument shows, takes it as non-negotiable that God is “that than 
which a greater cannot be conceived.” Nothing less could be a proper object 
of worship. In analyzing the relationship of God to creation, and eternity to 
time, the starting point is the perfection of God, and the method is to unpack 
that concept. If it can be shown that some (logically and metaphysically pos-
sible) att ribute is entailed by perfection, then we know that God has that at-
tribute. And if a certain (logically and metaphysically possible) view about 
the world follows from God’s having this att ribute, then we know that that is 
indeed how the world is. So, for example, Anselm takes it that the tenseless 
view of time follows from the divine perfection of eternity, and so we know 
that time is tenseless. This is quite a diﬀ erent approach from that taken by 
many contemporary philosophers of religion who, recognizing the connec-
tion between divine eternity and the tenseless view of time, start their argu-
ment from an analysis of the nature of time, fi nd the tenseless view prob-
lematic, and conclude that time is tensed and God must be temporal.7 
Anselm would see this as going about the project backwards, since 
theories about the way the world works are simply less important than 
an adequate conception of God. Certainly if it could be shown that the 
tenseless view of time is inherently contradictory, or confl icts with some 
deeply important commitment—to a robust analysis of human freedom 
and moral responsibility, for example—then the tenseless view of time, 
and the understanding of divine eternity which entails it, might be on the 
negotiating table. But otherwise, since perfection seems to entail eternity, 
we should conclude that God is timeless and time is tenseless. Later I will 
address the problem that four-dimensionalism is almost unimaginably 
strange. Anselm does not fi nd this a terribly pressing problem. If reason 
shows that something is the case, we ought to accept it, even if we limited 
human beings cannot comprehend how it is the case.8
But does Anselm really insist that God is timeless? In the Monologion, his 
fi rst philosophical work, Anselm argues that God must be “in” all places 
and times, in that for them to exist He must be presently causing them. But 
He is “in” no places or times if by “in” we mean He is limited to a given 
place or time as spatio-temporal creatures are. It is quite impossible that 
God should exist wholly at a single time, since He is simple and hence His 
being and His life are identical. Were His life stretched out across time 
it “would not exist all at once, but rather in parts, extended through the 
parts of time.” And we cannot say this because, “His eternity is nothing 
other than His very self . . . if His eternity has a past, present, and future, 
it would follow that His very being has a past, present, and future.”9 But 
that is impossible since God is simple. 
6 Faith and Philosophy
In the Proslogion he reiterates what he had said in the Monologion. Chap-
ter 19 is entitled, “That He is not in place or time, but all times and places 
are in Him.” Here he writes,
In your eternity is there anything past, so that it does not exist now, 
or anything future as if it does not exist yet? It is not that you ex-
isted yesterday and will exist tomorrow, but yesterday, today and 
tomorrow, you exist. On the contrary, you exist neither yesterday, 
nor today, nor tomorrow, rather you are simply beyond all time. For 
yesterday, today and tomorrow are nothing other than temporal. 
You, however, although nothing exists without you, are not thereby 
in place or time, but everything is in you. Nothing contains you, but 
you contain everything.
What especially suggests four-dimensionalism in these texts is the paral-
lel way in which space and time are treated. When Anselm writes that 
all places are present to God he certainly means that all actual places are 
equally real, “contained in” God in the sense that He keeps them immedi-
ately in being. If all actual times are present to God, all “contained in” the 
simple and immutable unity of divine eternity, then it follows that they 
are all equally real.
His last completed philosophical work, On the Harmony of the Fore-
knowledge and the Predestination and the Grace of God with Free Will, oﬀ ers the 
clearest statement of four-dimensionalism. In Book 1, chapter 5 he writes, 
“Just as the present time contains all place and whatever is in any place, in 
the same way the eternal present encloses all time and whatever exists in 
any time. . . . For eternity has its own unique simultaneity in which exist 
all the things which exist at the same place or time, and whatever exists 
in the diﬀ erent places and times.” Time is a fourth dimension containing 
all of space, and divine eternity is a sort of fi ft h dimension containing all 
time and space. 
The reason that Anselm fi nds himself discussing the nature of time in a 
book about freedom and foreknowledge is that, as I will explain below, the 
four-dimensionalist position allows him to hold that it is the event of our 
actual free choice which causes God’s knowledge of the choice. Since all 
times are present to God, my actual choice at the time when I make it to-
morrow can be the causally originating source of God’s “fore”knowledge 
today. But the fact that eternalism solves the dilemma of freedom and 
foreknowledge is really icing on the metaphysical cake for Anselm. As he 
explained in his earlier works on the nature of God, eternity is a necessary 
att ribute of a perfect being. 
Anselmian Eternalism Further Explained
Anselm discusses time and eternity more than this quick glance might 
suggest, but he does not write a separate treatise on the question or really 
try to develop four-dimensionalism.10 In this section I hope to clarify the 
entailments of Anselmian eternalism. I adopt the term “Anselmian” to in-
dicate that I intend my unpacking of the concept of four-dimensionalism, 
while not based on Anselm’s text, to be in keeping with his views. On the 
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question of freedom and foreknowledge, however, I will not need to go 
far beyond his text, since he himself explains what is, to my mind, a very 
plausible eternalist solution. 
What then is Anselmian eternalism? First it will help to note how time 
seems to us. This is not actually how it is, according to the Anselmian, 
but temporal appearance is a good place to start, and then we can move 
to temporal reality, and then to eternity. The more obvious view of time, 
what could be called the “common-sense” view, is presentism. All that 
exists is the present, and time is essentially tensed.11 The past does not 
exist since it is no longer present, although it may be “fi xed” in that what 
happened, happened and cannot be undone. The future does not exist 
since it is not yet present, and it is “open” in that there are alternative pos-
sibilities relative to what will happen.12 On this common-sense view we, 
and all that is, must exist only at the present instant since that is all there 
is. This is a very tenuous sort of existence since the present is an extension-
less point at which the non-existent future becomes the non-existent past. 
And thus, all there is to anything is the ever-changing, thin and fl ickering 
present existence.13
This is how time appears, but appearances are deceiving. The common-
sense view, on the Anselmian understanding of things, is the result of the 
very limited perspective of temporal perceivers.14 In fact time is essen-
tially tenseless. What we temporal perceivers call present and past and 
future are relative to a given perceiver at a given point in time. What any 
given perceiver at any given time perceives as present is not ontologically 
privileged over what that perceiver holds to be past or future. In fact all 
times exist equally. This does not do away with the temporal relations 
of “before,” “aft er,” and “at the same time as.” The Civil War is always 
objectively before the First World War, but whether or not “today” is in 
1863 or in 1918 is relative to the temporal perceiver.15 In analyzing the 
nature of temporal things, the standard division is between endurantism 
and perdurantism. According to the former view an object or event is 
wholly present at a given time, but exists, perhaps as “repeated,” at each 
of the times at which it exists. The latt er view holds that temporal objects 
and events exist four-dimensionally across time as a series of what can 
be called “time-slices.” Each time-slice at each moment constitutes only a 
part of the whole, while the whole consists in the sum of all the time-slices. 
Happily, the purposes of this paper do not require a decision between 
these two options. I fi nd perdurantism a bit more natural, and so I will 
assume that analysis, but I think the basic arguments I will make could be 
couched successfully in endurantist terms as well.16
When we try to map this view onto our lived experience it is exceedingly 
strange. I seem to myself to exist only at the present instant, but in fact the 
“I” of an instant ago really exists and perceives an instant ago as the present 
instant, and the “I” of an instant hence really exists and perceives an instant 
hence as the present instant. And these successive time-slices of “me” do 
not have access to one another. Perhaps I-at-present-at-t1 can aﬀ ect what 
I-at-present-at-t2 will be, but only by action at t1. And yet, I-at-present-at-t2, 
and all the other slices of “me” have the same ontological status. On the tra-
ditional Christian understanding of an embodied, and so presumably tem-
poral, immortality, there are an infi nite number of time-slices of any human 
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being stretching into what to us is the future, and each as real as any other 
time-slice starting with conception.17 Very, very strange.
Four-dimensionalism presents a peculiar-looking universe, but it is en-
tailed by the Anselmian conception of divine eternity. God is timeless, and 
thus we have what Hasker calls, “Anselm’s barrier” since, “God neither 
exists, nor acts, nor knows in time.” But, it would be a mistake to em-
phasize “Anselm’s barrier” without also noting what might be called “An-
selm’s bridge.” Although God is “timeless” in that His life is not stretched 
out four-dimensionally across time as our lives are, it does not follow that 
He is incapable of being related to the temporal universe. Anselm is ada-
mant that all of time is “contained in” divine eternity, which is to say God 
knows and acts causally upon all of space-time in one, eternal, act. That 
a timeless God can know and interact with the created universe is a view 
that has been adequately defended in the contemporary literature by a 
number of philosophers, including Hasker, and I do not think it necessary 
to repeat the various arguments here.19 
Two medieval spatial analogies for this “outside of yet present to” re-
lationship of time and eternity are helpful, although Anselm does not use 
them. One is the circle, where, according to rather mystical Neo-platonic 
geometry, the center point is the causal source of the circumference.20 The 
center is not on the circumference, but it is related to each and every point 
on the circumference equally. So God is the source of each temporal in-
stant. He is not contained in any of the temporal instants, but is directly, 
causally and cognitively related to each and every one of them equally. 
Another analogy is the observer on the highest peak who sees all the ob-
jects and events in the plain below.21 Those below can perceive only what 
is in their immediate environs. They do not have cognitive or causal ac-
cess to all the objects and events in the plain because most are too distant 
spatially. But the keen observer above, because of his unique perspective, 
can perceive each and every one of them equally. 
I do not say that those who employed these spatial analogies necessarily 
adopted the tenseless view of time, but just that the analogies suggest four-
dimensionalism. All the points of the circle are equally real. They must be 
since each stands in the same relationship to the center which is its source. 
All the objects and events on the plain are equally real. They must be, else 
the observer on the height could not perceive them all at once. Anselm’s 
analysis of eternity as a fi ft h dimension present to all of four-dimensional 
space-time oﬀ ers a less concrete image. Perhaps, though, it comes closer 
to being a description of the actual situation than do the rather distant 
spatial analogies. Divine eternity, “encompasses all time and whatever ex-
ists at any time.”22 And if all times are equally real in the eyes of God, they 
are equally real simpliciter, since it is God’s perspective that determines 
ultimate reality.23
Note that the claim that all times and places exist with equal reality in 
God’s eternity does not entail that each spatio-temporal object and event ex-
ists twice, once in time and once in eternity. Hasker seems to express such 
an entailment when he writes that temporal things exist for only a brief 
period in time “but they also possess an existence in eternity that knows 
no temporal bounds . . . all the familiar things and events of everyday life 
do not really pass away, as we seem to see them do, but instead persist 
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eternally— . . . the existence of my chalk-stub is as enduring as that of the 
Andromeda galaxy.”24 This is a misunderstanding. Consider the analogy 
with space. All of space is within God’s omnipresence in that it is all imme-
diately cognitively and causally present to and absolutely dependent upon 
God. This is how the terminology, “exists in” or “exists within” should be 
understood. But spatial things do not possess a double existence, one spa-
tial and one non-spatial, or become more spatially extended, or even om-
nipresent, because they “exist in” God’s omnipresence. Nor do temporal 
things possess a double existence or become eternal because they exist in 
God’s eternity. The claim that all of space-time exists equally in immediate 
causal dependence on God does not entail that the spatio-temporal events 
and objects cease to occupy their locations in space and time. Hasker’s 
chalk does not add any more time slices to its span of existence by being 
immediately present to divine eternity. It and the Andromeda galaxy are 
equally present to eternity, but the chalk does not “endure” (or perdure) 
as long as the Andromeda galaxy since to endure is to last across time. 
The Neo-platonic circle analogy is helpful here. That all the points on the 
circumference of the circle exist equally in causal dependence on the center 
point does not in any way alter their position on the circumference or al-
low them to occupy more than a single point. Nor does it bring them into 
the center, or give them a dual existence in both the circumference and the 
center. So each thing at each place and time is immediately present to God, 
but that does not somehow remove it from its position in place and time. 
Perfection Entails Eternity
But why suppose that God is eternal in this Anselmian sense which entails 
that time is essentially tenseless? There are a number of reasons, and I will 
try to sketch several, but fi rst it should be noted that a desire to set God 
outside the hurly-burly of this changing world is most emphatically not 
among them. Some among the Open Theists have opined that the reason 
earlier Christian philosophers insisted upon the eternity of God was that 
they were taken with the Hellenistic view of a God who does not dirty His 
hands in the world of time and space.25 Certainly the early Christian think-
ers were heavily infl uenced by Greek thought, but it is a mistake to sup-
pose that acceptance of divine eternity was inspired by a desire to remove 
God from contact with His creation. It is Augustine who begins the serious 
philosophical eﬀ ort to hammer out the doctrine of divine eternity. The mo-
tive for his work is to show that a God who is immutable can nonetheless 
be an agent who acts in the world and who knows his individual creatures 
and what they are doing. Though Anselm is the fi rst unambiguous four-
dimensionalist, Augustine’s recognition that an eternal God could be both 
immutable and an actor in the world constitutes an inestimable contribu-
tion to Christian thought. This becomes clear if one compares his views to 
those of the later Islamic Aristotelians like Avicenna and Averroes who held 
that God is immutable but assumed, following Aristotle and apparently 
without question, that time was essentially tensed. God’s being timeless, 
then, meant that He exists only in the present since that’s all there is, but 
He is absolutely unchanging. This led them to conclude that God just does 
not interact with creation, and in fact does not even know individuals at all. 
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So the criticism of the Open Theists is well-taken if aimed at these Islamic 
Aristotelians (Al-gazali beat them to the punch by about a millenium), but 
it misunderstands the Christian tradition pioneered by Augustine. 
Boethius discusses time and eternity in his Consolation of Philosophy. 
He is trying to make the case that, in spite of the fact that he has lost 
everything and is in prison awaiting a brutal execution, all will be well 
because human freedom can be reconciled with a genuinely good and 
sovereign God who acts in the world and knows what happens even in 
the future. In other words, he is arguing the very opposite of the view 
that God is aloof from the world of time and change. Presumably a phi-
losophy which concluded to the latt er sort of God would not be very 
consoling. As Christians, the late classical and medieval eternalists were 
absolutely committ ed to a God who interacts with creation, answers 
prayers, becomes incarnate, judges the nations, etc. And so long as you 
get the right theory of time, as Anselm does, you can have all of that, plus 
everything “Hellenistic” you might have wanted in the way of a perfect 
being, without contradiction. 
So the issue is not to remove God from His creation. Why, then is being 
eternal a perfection? Well, as Augustine argued, an eternal being can be 
both immutable and an agent who acts and reacts in the world. Why insist 
that God is immutable? One Anselmian argument depends on unpack-
ing the concept of a necessarily perfect being. Obviously a perfect being 
cannot get bett er. Nor can He get worse since He’d be corruptible now if 
He could. Many contemporary philosophers of religion argue that that 
leaves plenty of room for lateral change. God does not do or become bett er 
or worse, but just other. The Anselmian response trades on assumptions 
which are rather at odds with the Zeitgeist, but perhaps that in itself is 
a good reason to discuss it. On Anselm’s understanding of the universe, 
drawn from Augustine, all that has ontological status of any sort is active-
ly good.26 The universe is imbued with value, and all objects and events are 
either good, or suﬀ er from a privation of the good they ought to have and 
hence are bad. The very concept of value neutrality is un-Anselmian. But 
surely it doesn’t matt er whether we choose chocolate or pistachio? No, it 
probably doesn’t, but either choice is either good or bad depending on the 
circumstances. There is nothing neutral about eating ice cream. God could 
not gain a new property or perform a new action without that property 
or action adding to His goodness as a being or as an agent. And the clas-
sical conception of essential perfection is that a genuinely perfect being 
necessarily possesses to an unlimited extent all the “great-making” prop-
erties—Anselm in the Proslogion expresses it as those properties which it 
is intrinsically and absolutely bett er to have than to lack. Thus there is no 
room for any additions. 
For example, take the question that motivates Augustine’s discussion of 
time in Book 11 of the Confessions: What was God doing before He made 
the world? If originally He was not creating, and then He became a cre-
ator, He would become bett er. And there’s a diﬀ erence between intending 
to create and creating, so if God goes from being someone who intends 
to create to being someone who creates He’s changed for the bett er. But 
then He does not possess perfection as a necessity of His nature. If time 
is tensed, as Avicenna and Averroes assume, such that God has always 
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existed in the past, and God, being perfect, cannot change, then it follows 
that God forever in the past has been doing just what He does now. The 
universe has always existed and has been going on in essentially the same 
way as it goes on now, and God does not step in as an actor on the world 
stage. This was the gist of the Aristotelian side in the bitt er debate over 
the “eternity” of the world which divided Christian, Jewish, and Islamic 
philosophers in the Middle Ages. But if God is eternal in the Anselmian 
sense, and time is tenseless, then He does all He does in one immutable act 
which encompasses the creation “in the beginning,” the parting of the Red 
Sea, the Incarnation, the Last Times etc. So if God is unlimited perfection 
He must be immutable. And if He is an actor in the temporal world, then 
He must be eternal as Anselm understands the term, where all of space-
time is present to Him.27
Moreover, if God is perfect, then He must exist in the most perfect way. 
Again, the Spirit of the Age might suggest that things either exist or they 
don’t, and there are not degrees of existence. Certainly Anselm appreciates 
the distinction between existence and non-existence. But he holds, with at 
least a certain amount of intuitive plausibility, that there can be degrees in 
ontological value. For example, the famous Proslogion argument requires 
that it is greater to exist in reality outside the created mind, than to exist 
only as a fi ctive object dependent on a created mind. Regarding ontologi-
cal status the claim is that eternal existence is higher on the scale of being 
than temporal existence. We have seen that if time is essentially and abso-
lutely tensed then any existent thing exists only at the extensionless point 
at which the non-existent future becomes the non-existent past. Even if a 
being should remain essentially the same, its past is gone and its future is 
not yet. This seems a very limited sort of being.
If time is essentially tenseless, then even temporal creatures have a 
more robust sort of existence than that possessed by (almost?) any being 
on the tensed assumption. I would tentatively suggest that it may be that 
in the tenseless universe even an instantaneous temporal creature all of 
whose existence consists in a single time-slice may be bett er oﬀ  ontologi-
cally than any citizen of tensed-world, in that, while what is present to it 
is brief, it does not cease to be in an absolute sense. It is always real in 
four-dimensional space-time there at its own instant. The possible excep-
tion relative to this ontological superiority would be an everlasting being 
in tensed-world in that, though it exists only at the present instant, it does 
not come into being or cease to exist. In tenseless-world a being that ex-
ists across many time-slices would presumably be ontologically superior 
with regard to temporal status to the instantaneous being since there is 
just more to it. It should be noted, though, that the superiority in question 
here is relative only to temporal status. A cat might be shorter-lived than 
a boulder, but the Anselmian holds that there is “more to” the cat than 
to the boulder, since the former not only exists but lives a sentient life, 
and it is probably safe to say that on the Great Chain of Being, sentience 
trumps longevity. But this point cannot be used to show that God might be 
perfect without existing in the best way regarding temporal status, since 
God must have all perfections perfectly. Anselm’s doctrine of eternity pro-
claims God’s being to be simple and immutable, lacking in nothing, and 
yet infi nitely rich in that all that is not God is ever-present to Him. Unless 
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eternity entails some logical or metaphysical impossibility, if it is the most 
ontologically perfect way to exist, then God is eternal.
Hasker notes that, on the hypothesis of an essentially tenseless time, 
temporal creatures have a more ontologically robust existence than they 
would on the tensed assumption, and he takes this to count against the 
view that God is eternal in the Anselmian sense.28 He suggests that it is 
“metaphysically extravagant” to posit a superior existence for temporal 
things than the tensed view entails, but I do not see how this criticism is to 
be developed. If the proposal that things in tenseless-world have a supe-
rior sort of being to things in tensed-world is correct, that would seem to 
be a reason for God to prefer to create tenseless-world over tensed-world, 
if He had the choice. (I take it that this is actually one choice He does not 
have, since He is necessarily eternal and the tenseless view of time is an 
entailment of Anselmian eternity.) 
Hasker argues further that if the things in tenseless-world possess a 
more robust ontological status than things in tensed-world then one rea-
son for att ributing eternity to God, i.e., that it elevates Him ontologically 
far above the level of His creation, disappears.29 But this does not follow. 
True, there is more to us ontologically than meets the temporal eye, and 
surely that is good news for us. Yet God is still vastly superior to the citi-
zen of the essentially tenseless spatio-temporal universe. His life is not 
spread out in a succession of radically limited slices, and it is His knowl-
edge and causal activity which sustains all the moments of space-time in 
being as immediately present to Him.
And then there is the question of God’s knowledge and power. Anselm 
holds, and Hasker agrees, that God’s knowledge is direct. Hasker writes, 
“It seems to me there is a strong case for regarding directness or imme-
diacy in itself [Hasker’s italics] as a ground of cognitive excellence.”30 That 
is, contrary to the standard view in contemporary philosophy of religion, 
divine omniscience is not best understood as God’s believing of all true 
propositions that they are true and of all false propositions that they are 
false. To describe God’s knowledge this way is to ascribe to Him a radi-
cally limited way of knowing. Anselm and traditional classical theists in 
general hold that God knows things and events themselves, and He knows 
them directly. He does not know things and events through any sort of 
discursive process, nor through propositions about them. He is immedi-
ately aware of all things and events. Traditional classical theism insists 
that it is God’s thinking that sustains everything in being from moment to 
moment.31 Discursive and propositional knowing is far more limited than 
direct knowing. If direct knowing is possible, then that is how a perfect 
being knows. And of course, it is bett er to know everything knowable in 
the best possible way. Hasker holds that God is in time and hence can 
have direct knowledge only of the universe at the present instant. He must 
remember the past and anticipate, but not know, the future. On Anselm’s 
view God, being a perfect being, must know what is to us past, present, 
and future, and He must know it all directly. This is possible on the view 
that God is eternal and that time is essentially tenseless. 
It is oft en said that a timeless God cannot be omniscient because He can-
not know what time it is now. But this criticism presupposes the essentially 
tensed view of time. On the tenseless view it is true that God cannot know 
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what time it is at some italicized “now,” but that is because there is no 
such thing. God can know that at any time, the time slice of the temporally 
aware creature located at that time perceives that instant as “now.” And, 
in knowing us, God may know the phenomenology of our experience of 
“now.” But there simply is no ontologically privileged now. It is our limited 
perspective which leads us to believe that there is. Analogously, someone 
who thought that only his “here”—the location immediately available to 
his present experience—really existed might insist that an omnipresent 
God cannot be omniscient because He cannot know what place it is here. 
But it is this spatially limited perceiver who has made the mistake, since 
existent space is not confi ned to what is “here” for him. God knows what 
the spatially aware creature means by “here,” but there just is no absolute 
here to be known. If the criticism is that God cannot know what it is to 
experience things in exactly the way a limited, temporal creature knows it, 
that is by being limited and temporal, than that is true, but innocuous. God 
cannot do the logically impossible.32 
An argument to eternity analogous to the one from omniscience can be 
made from omnipotence. Immediate causal power is clearly less limited 
than causal power which requires intermediaries to achieve its eﬀ ects. 
And a being who is able to act immediately upon all of what we call 
past, present, and future, is more powerful than a being whose activity is 
confi ned to the present instant. And again, this is only possible if God is 
eternal and time is essentially tenseless. Hasker, in discussing “simple” 
foreknowledge presents an argument which might be used to show that 
being eternal would not increase the scope of God’s causal power, but 
this possible criticism, to which I respond below, stems from a misunder-
standing of the Anselmian position. So the Anselmian view ascribes to 
God the most perfect mode of acting, of knowing, and of being, and this 
perfection entails divine eternity and the tenseless view of time. I will 
argue below that, as an added bonus, this view also allows us to reconcile 
libertarian freedom with divine “fore”knowledge. 
Admitt edly the tenseless view is very, very strange, but strange is not 
logically or metaphysically impossible. The universe of contemporary 
physics is mind-bogglingly bizarre, especially in comparison to the cog-
nitively manageable, mechanistic universe of the nineteenth century. But 
this wildly strange universe with which the physicists confront us is the 
one entailed by our scientifi c commitments, and few dispute the science 
on the grounds that its consequences are too weird. Given that an analysis 
of “that than which a greater cannot be conceived” pushes the limits of 
human reason, we should not really expect it to result in anything short of 
the almost unimaginable. Are there, however, insurmountable diﬃ  culties 
with Anselmian eternalism? A number of problems with the theory of di-
vine eternity have been raised recently, especially by William Hasker and 
other Open Theists. I now turn to these criticisms. 
Is Anselmian Eternalism Just Too Strange?
I said above that we should be prepared to accept strangeness in trying to 
analyze the relationship of creation to the Creator. But if the strange strays 
over into incoherence, perhaps that is reason to reject the strange view. 
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Hasker apparently fi nds it self-refuting for someone to claim, as I do, that 
she fi nds herself a four-dimensional being in a tenseless universe. A pos-
sible avenue of defense might be from the natural sciences. Contemporary 
physics oﬀ ers arguments in support of the tenseless view of time, and I 
think the Anselmian is justifi ably charmed to fi nd physics on her side. But 
I am not competent to assess the arguments, nor do I think it is wise, in 
doing philosophy of religion, or metaphysics in general, to depend too 
heavily on the more theoretical claims of the natural sciences. Scientifi c 
theories come and go. More importantly, the Anselmian is committ ed to 
the position that there is just more to the universe than is covered in the 
subject matt er of the natural sciences—God, objective moral truth, that 
sort of thing—so that while the sciences tell us a great deal about how 
things really are, they do not tell us all. In the unlikely event that tomor-
row the community of physicists should conclude that the universe seems 
to be absolutely tensed aft er all, the committ ed Anselmian will quickly get 
over the disappointment and continue to hold that all time is present to 
God and hence tenseless.
Moreover, Hasker’s concern is aimed at the world as we experience it. 
In doing philosophy of religion, surely this is where the heart of the dis-
cussion should take place. The real worry is that we cannot make sense 
of our experience as persons in relationship to a personal God, if God 
is eternal and time is tenseless. Whatever physics may say, our faith re-
quires that our philosophy cohere with the world of experience in which 
we eat our dinners and raise our children. Hasker, I take it, holds that 
the tenseless view of time cannot be squared with lived experience, and 
this is a criticism that needs to be addressed. If I am understanding him 
correctly he associates the tenseless view with the position that “our ex-
perience of the passage of time is wholly illusory” and with a denial that 
“I experience sequence and change in my experience.”33 But that is not 
correct. I do experience the passage of time, sequence and change. On 
the tenseless view I analyze that experience, at least in part, as my expe-
rience at t1 being diﬀ erent from my experience at t2. What I deny is that 
the whole of my being is exhausted by existence at t1 or at t2. Rather I 
exist at both and at all the other times over which my existence extends, 
and none of the times has an ontological status which is privileged over 
any other. 
That there should be space-time slices of me existing at what I now 
(that is the space-time slice typing at this instant) call past and present is 
bizarre, but the fi rst thing to note is that there is no non-bizarre theory of 
time. As Augustine remarked, as far as our experience goes, even what I 
have called the “common sense” view seems exceedingly strange when 
you begin to try to make sense of it. I fi nd it close to unthinkable that what 
there is to me, and all there is to me, is what exists at this unextended pres-
ent at which the non-existent future becomes the non-existent past.34 So in 
defending the tenseless view I do not propose to replace a theory we can 
comfortably grasp with one that almost eludes our thinking. We are con-
fronted with two very diﬃ  cult analyses of time. For the sake of argument, 
allow that the tenseless view is somewhat more diﬃ  cult. If the stranger 
theory fi ts bett er with the hypothesis that God is a perfect being, I do not 
think the modest increase in bizarreness should count against it.
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Secondly, it is possible to make some sense of our experience in a 
tenseless world. Hasker writes, “even if all such facts are ontologically 
exactly on a par and neither come into being nor pass away, there re-
mains the fact that I experience these facts in a certain order”[Hasker’s 
italics].35 I take it that what seems appallingly odd is that there should be 
me existing at all the times across which my life extends, such that each 
time-slice of me experiences its own instant, all the instants exist equally, 
and I, at each instant, cannot access the experience I have at each other 
instant. But here is an att empt to make this proposal less incredible. Take 
the closest human analogue to the eternal God’s-eye-point-of-view, that 
is the experience of the time-traveler. All of time is not present to him at 
once as it is to God. Still, he has more freedom of access to the four-di-
mensional block of space-time than the rest of us, and so his case can be 
instructive. In order for the analogy to be helpful we need to make a dis-
tinction standard in the time-travel literature. There is what can be called 
objective or “clock” time, that is the normal sequence of events as they 
are experienced by humanity as a whole (with the possible, sometime ex-
ception of the time-traveler). Call this HST, Human Standard Time. And 
then there is the sequence of events as experienced by the time traveler. 
Call this PT, Personal Time. The fi ft eenth century is before the nineteenth 
century in HST, but a time-traveler who went to the nineteenth century 
and then to the fi ft eenth century would experience the nineteenth before 
the fi ft eenth in PT.
Let us say there is a time-traveler. Call him Bill. Bill is outside the 
Circle K convenience store at t1 HST when a time machine appears and 
out steps Bill. The Bills both exist at the same time HST, but let us say 
that the Bill who steps out of the time machine is at a later point PT 
than the Bill who watched the machine arrive. The earlier PT Bill will 
get into the time machine, travel a bit, and then return to the Circle K, 
as the later PT Bill, to step out and confront the earlier PT Bill. What we 
have at t1 HST are two PT time-slices of Bill existing at the same time 
HST. But because they exist at diﬀ erent times PT , Bill at t1 (PT) does not 
have any immediate, inner, experiential access to Bill at t2 (PT) and vice 
versa. (Although Bill at t2 (PT) remembers being Bill at t1 (PT).) From 
the perspective of personal time, what Bill at t1 (PT) experiences as the 
present is diﬀ erent from what Bill at t2 (PT) experiences as the present. 
But the two slices at the same time HST exist equally and neither is on-
tologically privileged. Fans of time-travel stories and fi lms run into this 
sort of situation all the time and seem to make sense of it. My claim is 
that if we fi nd it coherent that Bill at t1 (PT) and Bill at t2 (PT) are both 
genuinely Bill, with diﬀ erent “presents” (PT), without immediate access 
to the inner experience of the other, and without one having an onto-
logically privileged status over the other, it is not incoherent to propose 
what would be the norm regarding human life on the four-dimensional-
ist view: Bill at t1 (HST) and Bill at t2 (HST) can be equally real, with dif-
ferent “presents” (HST) but not have access to “each other.” Of course, 
that a scenario fi gures in a fi lm does not make it scientifi cally, or perhaps 
even metaphysically, possible. But if the criticism of the tenseless view 
of time is that it is inconceivable, I think the time-travel analogy oﬀ ers 
some conceptual help. 
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Does Anselmian Eternalism Confl ict with Libertarian Freedom?
Anselmian eternalism does entail the odd position that time is tenseless, 
but unless that view can be shown to be logically contradictory this entail-
ment should not lead us to abandon eternalism. It is time to turn to Hask-
er’s criticisms of eternalism itself. Divine eternity does not seem to be an 
intrinsically contradictory divine att ribute. Above I argued that it is a real 
perfection. Assuming Anselm’s method of taking the perfection of God as 
the non-negotiable starting point, denying eternity to God would have to 
be justifi ed by pointing to some contradiction between the ascription of 
eternity and other att ributes of God, or other equally non-negotiable com-
mitments. Sometimes it is asserted that an eternal God could not act upon 
or react to the objects and events in time. There is a long literature on this 
topic, but to my knowledge the debate has largely proceeded without the 
assumption of the tenseless view of time, and so has not really spoken to 
the Anselmian claims.36 I hope the explanation of eternalism and tenseless 
time above has made clear that this assertion is mistaken, but perhaps just 
a bit more elaboration is in order. 
Presumably the subscriber to the essentially tensed view of time sup-
poses that God in the present acts and reacts to present events. For example, 
if Hasker is correct to hold that God knows present things directly, then 
God in the present causes me to exist in the present, and, at the same pres-
ent moment, my freely choosing to type in the present causes God to know 
that I am typing. So Hasker should be comfortable holding that God in the 
present acts and reacts to present events. Thus, regarding the relationship 
of God to creation, action and reaction do not necessarily involve relations 
of past and future.37 
The subscriber to the essentially tenseless view of time makes a minor 
adjustment to the proposed picture of God’s acting and reacting in the 
present, and simply adds that all of time is present to God. God is causing 
the universe’s fi rst day, and the parting of the Red Sea, and the Incarnation, 
and He is listening to Monica’s prayers that Augustine should abandon 
that Manichean nonsense, and He is keeping in being whatever you will 
have for breakfast tomorrow etc. etc. etc., and He is doing it all in one eter-
nal act. Unless you pack into the defi nitions or analyses of causing, acting, 
and reacting that they must involve temporal relations of past and future, 
there is nothing contradictory in saying that God acts upon and reacts 
with all temporal objects and events as immediately present to Him. And 
the Anselmian method entails that adherence to the goal of preserving the 
most robust picture of divine perfection sett les the debated issue of how to 
defi ne or analyze causation, acting, and reacting. If we agree that it would 
be more perfect for God to cause, act, and react in a single, eternal act, then 
we have excellent reason to adopt a theory of causation, acting, and react-
ing, that does not confl ict with that view of God.
There is nothing in the Anselmian doctrine of eternity to confl ict with the 
non-negotiable commitment that God is a real agent in the universe. But 
what of human agency? Hasker argues that the Anselmian view renders 
human libertarian freedom impossible. Were this the case it would indeed 
be powerful reason for rethinking eternalism. Anselm is the fi rst Christian 
philosopher to att empt a systematic defense of libertarian freedom. He 
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takes libertarian freedom to be extremely important, and defends both fac-
ets of the libertarian account; the human agent chooses between genuinely 
open options, and the ultimate source of the choice is the agent himself.38 
So Anselm himself would literally be the fi rst to hold that if divine eter-
nity confl icts with libertarian freedom, it may be the former rather than the 
latt er that has to go. Happily, the apparent confl ict can be resolved with-
out abandoning either commitment. I make this argument at more length 
elsewhere, but I would like to oﬀ er an outline of the argument here in the 
interests of completeness.39 
The problem concerning eternity and libertarian freedom is analogous 
to the dilemma of freedom and divine foreknowledge, so it will be help-
ful to look fi rst at the latt er, more familiar, argument. Informally, it goes 
like this: God knew in the past that you would choose to do x tomorrow. 
God’s knowledge is infallible. The past is necessary in that it is now unalter-
ably “fi xed.” Therefore, by a “transfer of necessity,” it is necessary that you 
choose to do x tomorrow.40 But if it is necessary, then you cannot do other-
wise. And since the ability to do otherwise is requisite for libertarian free-
dom, you are not free with respect to choosing to do x. And so for all future 
choices on the assumption that God knows the future. Nor will it suﬃ  ce to 
say that God’s knowledge does not entail or involve causal determinism. 
Even if the necessity in question is not a causal necessity, still you cannot do 
otherwise and so you are not free. 
That, in outline, is the dilemma of freedom and divine foreknowledge. 
Anselm takes it that supposing that God is eternal solves the problem. But 
how? Hasker argues, as do many contemporary philosophers of religion, 
that the claim that God is eternal does nothing to mitigate the diﬃ  culty. 
Eternity is just as “fi xed” as is the past and so an analogous argument can 
be run where “God knew in the past . . . is replaced with “God knows in 
eternity. . . . And it does seem to follow that if God knows in eternity that 
you choose to do x at t, then necessarily you choose to do x at t, you cannot 
do otherwise and you are not free. Hasker says that “divine timelessness 
can be reconciled with libertarian freedom only if the following proposi-
tion is true: there are things that God timelessly believes which are such that it 
is in my power, now, to bring it about that God does not timelessly believe those 
things” [Hasker’s italics].41 The proposition is false, so God is not timeless. 
But this is all a bit too fast. To see this it is helpful to look at an ar-
gument which parallels the dilemmas concerning freedom and divine 
knowledge, whether past knowledge or timeless knowledge, but which 
makes only the modest supposition that God has present knowledge of 
what you choose at present. This parallel argument introduces the very 
plausible premise that the present is just as fi xed and necessary as the past 
or eternity. That is, if you choose to do x at the present moment, it follows 
by necessity that you choose to do x at the present moment. No one can 
bring it about that it is not the case that you choose to do x at the present 
moment. But then it follows that if God knows at the present moment that 
you choose to do x at the present moment, since it is impossible that God’s 
present knowledge should be other than it is, it is impossible that you 
choose otherwise than to do x, and hence you are not free. Hasker, given 
that he holds God’s knowledge of the present to be direct, must suppose 
that God in the present has knowledge of your choice in the present. If 
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that is the case then apparently God’s present knowledge confl icts with 
your present freedom. If God knows now that you choose to do x now, 
then necessarily you choose to do x now, you cannot choose otherwise, 
and you are not free. We can reconstruct Hasker’s challenge to the eternal-
ist as a challenge to someone who holds that God has present knowledge 
of a present choice: God’s knowledge of the present can be reconciled with 
libertarian freedom only if the following proposition is true: there are pres-
ent things that God presently believes which are such that it is in my power, now, 
to bring it about that God does not presently believe those things. The proposi-
tion is false and so apparently libertarian freedom cannot be reconciled 
with God’s present knowledge. 
One might accept the argument and conclude that God does not 
have present knowledge of present events. Instead, just like the rest of 
us, He learns through a temporal process such that things happen and 
God comes to know about them a short time later. This is such a radical 
downsizing of divine omniscience that it is surely an unatt ractive move. 
Hasker, I presume, would object to it since it would mean that God has no 
direct knowledge at all. It is more reasonable to conclude that something 
is wrong with the argument. My proposal is that, while it is true that if 
God knows you choose to do x at present, then necessarily you choose to 
do x at present, this is not the sort of necessity that confl icts with the most 
robust “ability to do otherwise” which is requisite for libertarian freedom. 
It is, to adopt Anselm’s terminology, merely a “consequent necessity,” 
that is the sort of logical necessity by which A follows (sequitur) necessar-
ily upon the positing of A.42 In the case of the consequent necessity of the 
free choice, not only is it non-causal, but it is self-imposed.43 Suppose that 
you now choose to do x with libertarian freedom. The claim is that it is 
your now choosing to do x that causes God’s present knowledge. True, “God 
knows you now choose to do x” entails “necessarily you now choose to do 
x,” but you, yourself are the ultimate source of the necessity. And clearly 
it is not a necessity that confl icts with your libertarian free choice since it 
was the libertarian free choice that caused the divine knowledge of the 
libertarian free choice which entailed the necessity of the libertarian free 
choice. (Note that the Molinist will not be able to appeal to this concept 
of a self-imposed and hence innocuous necessity, since the Molinist holds 
that it is not in fact the actual choices of free agents which ground the 
truth of the “counterfactuals of freedom” through which God can know 
the future.)44 In terms of preceding causes, there was no causal determina-
tion. You had open options. In choosing to do x you render it impossible 
that you choose otherwise than to do x, but the choice comes from your-
self. The requirements of libertarianism are satisfi ed.
What has all of this to do with eternity? The Anselmian claim is that 
all of time is present to God. Thus God knows that you choose to do x at 
t because t is present to Him and He “sees” you choose to do x at t. Your 
choice is the source of God’s knowledge. So we can say that if God time-
lessly knows that you choose to do x at t, necessarily you choose to do x 
at t. Or, from our temporal perspective, if God in the past knows that you 
will choose to do x in the future, necessarily you will choose to do x in the 
future. But this consequent necessity is entirely consistent with libertarian 
freedom since it is both non-causal and self-imposed. 
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Those familiar with the medieval tradition will recognize that the 
claim that our choices can be the cause of God’s knowledge is summarily 
rejected by many important philosophers including Augustine, Boethius, 
and Aquinas. They argue that God cannot possibly learn from or be af-
fected by creation. Anselm, however, is willing to allow the consequences 
of his libertarianism. He holds that our choices are the ultimate cause of 
God’s knowledge of them. He writes, “although it is necessary that what-
ever is foreknown and predestined [”predestination” for Anselm consists 
in God’s causing what He causes, and permitt ing what He does not cause] 
should happen, nevertheless these foreknown and predestined things do 
not result from any necessity which precedes the event (rem) and makes 
it happen, but rather from [the necessity] which follows upon the event 
(rem sequitur), as we said above.”45 
Does Anselmian Eternity Really Enhance God’s Power?
So God’s timeless knowledge does not confl ict with libertarian freedom. 
But there is a further question regarding God and the future. I argued 
above that God’s being eternal allows Him the fullest scope for His power 
in that He can act immediately on all of time, what is to any temporal 
creature at any given time, past, present, and future. An argument which 
Hasker makes regarding “simple” foreknowledge suggests he would dis-
pute this claim. Hasker argues that it is a mistake to hold that God’s know-
ing the actual future enhances divine sovereignty by allowing Him to use 
that knowledge to aﬀ ect the outcome of things. Divine foreknowledge, he 
argues, if it is “simple” foreknowledge, i.e., it is a matt er of God’s seeing 
what in fact is going to happen, is absolutely useless in that God can-
not use that knowledge to change the future. If, per impossibile, He could 
change the future, then what He had seen as happening in the future is 
not what happens in the future. Absurd. Hasker cites the case (borrowed 
from David Basinger) of a woman, Susan, seeking guidance with regards 
to marrying Tom. Suppose God sees that the future marriage will not be 
happy. Should God warn Susan not to marry Tom? “A moments refl ection 
will show this to be incoherent. What God knows is the actual future, the 
situation in which she is actually married to Tom. So it is nonsensical to 
suggest that God, knowing the actual future, could on the basis of this 
knowledge infl uence things so that this would not be the actual future, 
which would mean that God would not know Susan as being married to 
Tom.”46 Thus, “Simple foreknowledge . . . simply does not ‘help’ God in 
providentially governing the world.”47
Hasker is not speaking here specifi cally of the Anselmian position, but 
someone could argue along similar lines that if God knows all that will 
happen because He eternally sees it happening in tenseless time, such 
knowledge is useless because God can only perceive the actual, and so 
He cannot change what will be. But, at least on the Anselmian analysis 
of the relationship of God to creation, this argument rests upon a misun-
derstanding. True, God cannot change the future, any more than He can 
change the past or the present. That is, He cannot make what happens 
at t, not happen at t, whether t is, from our perspective, past, present or 
future. This is not a limitation on His power since even God cannot do the 
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logically impossible. If you choose to do x at t, then you choose to do x at 
t, and it is logically impossible that it is not the case that you choose to do 
x at t. But if He cannot change what happens, what use is it to God that all 
of space-time is immediately present to Him? 
In fact, it makes Him far more powerful than if He were circumscribed 
by the present instant. He cannot undo what happens at t, but He can bring 
about what happens at t. And having all of time immediately present to 
His power and His knowledge gives Him enormous power to bring things 
about. Again the analogy of the time-traveler can help make this clear. Let 
us say that time-traveler Ted at t2 (HST) realizes that in order to achieve 
his purposes he needs a certain set of keys. Being a clever fellow he fi gures 
out how to make time-travel work for him and, at t2, formulates a plan. He 
decides to wait until t3 (HST), and then go back to t1 (HST), before t2, and 
“borrow” the keys. Between t1 and t2 he’ll hide the keys in a convenient 
place, so they’ll be there when he arrives on the spot at t2. Immediately 
upon formulating the plan at t2 he checks the likeliest hiding spot, and 
sure enough there are the keys! He starts to worry that he might forget 
to go back from t3 to t1 and hide the keys, but then realizes that he does 
remember, since there are the keys. Note that Ted has not changed anything 
about what is to him the past, present, or future (HST or PT). That is logi-
cally impossible. Nonetheless the ability to travel in time gives him a great 
deal more power to achieve his purposes than he would have otherwise. 
He can’t make what happens not happen, but he can do a lot more towards 
bringing about what happens. And of course, the same is true of God only 
to an almost infi nitely greater degree. For example, seeing how people re-
spond to Him as Incarnate, and recognizing that it is diﬃ  cult for people to 
accept Him as the Messiah He can inform the prophets concerning what 
are to them future events (“They cast lots for his garments,” for instance) 
so that when He comes, His coming has been foretold, and the prophe-
cies make it easier for people to believe that Jesus is the promised one. 
Envisioning all of this “seeing,” acting, and reacting, as one eternal act is 
beyond human imagining, but that is a limitation of the temporal creature. 
And, again, unimaginable is not logically contradictory.
The Anselmian will insist that being eternal allows for a much more 
robust divine sovereignty than does the Open Theist view in which God 
does not have power over any time but the present, and does not know the 
future. However, it must be granted that the Anselmian does side with the 
Open Theists on the question of whether or not God “takes risks.” Either 
God determines our actions or He does not. If He does not, then it is up 
to us what we choose, and in creating us God takes the risk that we will 
choose against His will. On the Anselmian account God knows what we 
choose only because we choose it, and so He cannot know, “before” creat-
ing us, what we will choose and then decide accordingly whether to create 
us or not. It might seem, then, that the Molinist approach is preferable to 
the Anselmian. Doesn’t the Molinist analysis preserve libertarian freedom 
while defending a more absolute divine sovereignty? On the Molinist 
account God can survey all the “counterfactuals of freedom,” see what 
any possible free agent would choose in any possible situation, and then 
decide which agents and situations to actualize. Does He not then have 
much more control on the Molinist view? 
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Not at all! The Anselmian account admits that God has limited op-
tions, in that He cannot control the free choices of free creatures and He 
knows the choices only because they are made. But these limitations are 
ones which God chooses, motivated by His love and goodness which lead 
Him to create the great good of a world containing rational, free crea-
tures who, in their created independence, can rise to the level of images of 
the divine. Thus the Anselmian view, subscribing to traditional, classical 
theism, holds that all there is is God and what God has freely chosen to 
produce. (The tradition of Augustine and Anselm and Aquinas held it that 
the laws of logic and morality do not exist independently of God, nor are 
they created by Him, but rather they refl ect His nature as absolute Being 
and Good.) On the Molinist account God’s options are absolutely limited 
by the “counterfactuals of freedom.” These are contingent truths which 
exist as brute facts independently of God’s will. He did not create them 
and cannot aﬀ ect them. His sovereignty is radically limited and not by His 
own choice. In comparison to Anselm’s God, the God of the Molinists is 
rather like someone born in prison. He may be free in that he can choose 
which corner to sit in, but he has no power over the bars which circum-
scribe his actions. 
But Is Anselmian Eternalism Biblical?
A fi nal problem raised by Hasker and other Open Theists is the question 
of scriptural warrant for Anselmian eternalism. Were it the case that God’s 
being eternal entailed that He could not act as an agent in the world of 
space and time, then of course the Christian philosopher would have to 
abandon the view. But there is no contradiction. To say that God interacts 
with all of space-time in one eternal act is to explain how, not to deny that, 
a timeless and immutable God acts in creation. True, the texts which imply 
that God does not know the future or that He truly changes His mind, if 
taken in their prima facie sense, would confl ict with the Anselmian posi-
tion, but everyone who takes scripture seriously recognizes that some pas-
sages require interpretation. Which passages ought not be taken in their 
prima facie sense, how to read them, and who is to do the interpreting, are 
diﬃ  cult and divisive issues, to grossly understate the point. 
Open Theists grant that there are texts which, taken in their most obvi-
ous sense, confl ict with their position that God cannot know future free 
choices, such as those which seem to say that God or His prophets foresee 
a future free choice.48 The Open Theist must work to interpret these texts 
in a way consonant with his philosophy. Take, for example, the passage 
where Christ tells Peter that he will betray Him three times before the 
cock crows. Assuming people have libertarian freedom, this seems a very 
specifi c instance of God’s foreknowing a free choice. But if you accept the 
philosophical arguments against God’s knowing future free choices then 
you will have to read this passage in some less than obvious sense. Per-
haps this is one of those cases where the predicted choice is actually caus-
ally determined. In that case Peter has no reason to regret and weep, since 
he didn’t freely betray Christ. Or perhaps Christ is saying that Peter might 
betray him, or that Peter will, if certain other factors hold. All of these 
readings are possible, though a bit contorted. My point is not to dispute 
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the passage but to illustrate the claim that everyone who takes scripture 
seriously agrees that interpretation is required. The Open Theists have 
their preferred texts and interpretations, but so do all the rest of us Bible-
believing Christians. It is unlikely that a persuasive case can be made to 
decide the issue between the Anselmian and the Open Theist on the basis 
of scripture.
There are, however, two important reasons related to our biblically in-
spired faith to prefer the Anselmian position. First there is the question of 
our participating in the saving sacrifi ce of Christ. Speaking for myself, I 
have always assumed, (though I had not always conceptualized it clearly) 
that Christ died for my sins. That is, as He hung on the cross, somehow, 
in His divine nature, He knew me. Perhaps not all Christians share this 
perspective. It may be that it is an assumption rooted in my own tradition 
of Roman Catholicism which insists upon an actual, physical participation 
in the historical death and resurrection of Christ through the Eucharist. 
But in any case, the Open Theist cannot hold, as the Anselmian can, that 
Christ at the moment in history when He suﬀ ered for His people, actually 
knew those for whom He died.49 Presumably the Open Theist can say that 
He, in His divine nature, knew that plenty of people would exist in the 
future. He could know that He would not let the race die out prematurely. 
What He could not know is just which individuals would exist. The Open 
Theist can hold that, when Christ died, He died for somebody’s sins, but it 
is the Anselmian who can hold, what seems to me the more religiously 
adequate view, that He died for our sins.
And there is a second important point to be made about the Bible. The 
Open Theist holds that God does not know the future. Discussing the 
question of seeking divine guidance using the example of a student won-
dering what to study, David Basinger writes that, “given that God may 
not know exactly what the state of the economy will be over the next fi ve 
or ten years, it is possible that what God in his wisdom believes at present 
to be the best course of study for a student may not be an option that will 
allow her aft er graduation to pursue the profession for which she has pre-
pared.”50 God’s guidance is not entirely trustworthy since He really doesn’t 
know what the future, even the near future, will hold. The Open Theists 
must be commended for not att empting to water down or white wash the 
radical consequences of their view. Basinger’s statement here of the practi-
cal implications of God’s ignorance of the future certainly sets the Open 
Theists at odds not only with the philosophical tradition of Christianity, 
but also, I take it, with the basic assumptions of most ordinary believ-
ers. But note especially the implications of Open Theism with respect to 
the importance of the Bible. The New Testament was writt en close to two 
thousand years ago, and the Old Testament is a compilation of texts from 
earlier periods. If God’s knowledge is shaky regarding the economic scene 
fi ve years hence, He probably knows very litt le about what the world will 
be like in two thousand years. But then why suppose that what He had 
to say two thousand plus years ago is relevant to us? With each passing 
generation we move further and further from the state of the world as God 
knew it when He inspired the writers of those old books. This may not 
entail that what the Bible has to say is exactly in error, but it casts serious 
doubt on whether or not it should be taken as a sound guide to how we, 
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today, should live our lives, since God did not know that you and I and the 
world in which we live would exist when He inspired the Bible. 
There are, of course, some schools of Christian thought that would 
welcome such a consequence, since it would conform nicely with their 
inclination to mold their reading of scripture to whatever best suits the 
Spirit of the Age. My impression is that the Open Theists aim to interpret 
scripture in a way consonant with the intent of the inspired authors, and 
that they also assume that the Bible is relevant to our concerns today. But 
given their philosophical views, these two positions are at least somewhat 
at odds. Undoubtedly the Open Theist can argue that the Bible has some 
broad and indirect relevance to us since it is important for us to know 
what Jesus and the early Christians said and did, and it is probably useful 
to us to see the truth as God understood it two thousand years ago. But it 
is the Anselmian who can hold that the Bible is immediately relevant to 
us today.51 Although the sacred books were writt en long ago, they were 
writt en with us in mind. 
Anselm’s version of eternalism is not defeated by the criticisms raised 
by Hasker and other Open Theists, it is entailed by the most robust con-
ception of divine perfection, and it allows us to understand the Bible as 
a work of immediate relevance to us today. True, as Anselm was the fi rst 
to recognize clearly, it requires us to adopt a four-dimensionalist view of 
time, but it is well worth that modest price.52
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